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1.0 Introduction
The UCI Artificial Intelligence Project has as its goal
the creation of computer programs that model human thought
processes.. Our primary interest is in the cognitive
mechanisms people have for using language. We are
interested in building a theory of human natural language
processing and in testing that theory by constructing
computer models. Thus the goal of our project is twofold:
we want to develop a theory of human cognition, and to
produce working programs capable of performing useful tasks
that involve natural language.
In much early work on language processing, syntax was
considered a central aspect of the nature of language, and
syntactic parsers became very important. There is a large
literature on parsing techniques for a variety of formal
languages (context-free, LR(k), etc.). The mechanisms were
very well understood, and efficiency became a matter of
prime concern. The bulk of recent work in natural language
processing in the fields of Artificial Intelligence and
Cognitive Psychology
[36,34,35,44,43,45,25,19,18,20,10,7,4,33,28,39] has regarded
understanding to be a mapping of natural language text into
a language-free representation of the meaning of that text.
Hence, much of the recent work in natural language has
focused on the representation of meaning, the structure of
knowledge, the organization of that knowledge in memory, and
the process of producing these representations from natural
language input.
Many current process models of language understanding
[3,6,7,12,15,20,30,31,32,34,35,37,42,44,45] are based
primarily on a process called "expectation-based
understanding" [31]. Expectation-based understanding
involves the reader's generating alternative expectations
about the possible meanings of a text, eventually producing
a single, unambiguous meaning. Generating expectations from
a piece of text helps in discriminating among the possible
readings of subsequent text: readings which correspond
closely to an existing expectation are preferred over those
not predicted. Reciprocally, subsequent input helps to
select a single unambiguous representation from the initial
large array of alternative expectations.
The process of expectation-based understanding can
account for human readers' ability to arrive at a single
meaning representation for a sentence in context which would
be highly ambiguous in isolation. For example, consider the
following:
[1] Kathy and Chris were playing golf. Kathy
wanted to let Chris win the game. She hit a
shot deep into the rough.
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We infer from the last sentence that "she" is Kathy, and
that she hit her ball into the rough on purpose, since that
will further her stated goal of letting Chris win the game.
The reason we can make these inferences is that the previous
sentences have suggested expectations, one of which can be
stated as follows:
Kathy will perform some action in service of her
goal of letting Chris win the golf game.
When she then hits her ball into the rough, that action is
checked against this expectation (among others), and it is
seen that the action can be interpreted as being in service
of Kathy's goal, and hence it is so interpreted. Without
such expectations, the statement "She hit a shot deep into
the rough" would more likely be interpreted as being an
accidental shot, rather than being intentionally performed.
Hence, understanding based on expectations (and
subsequent substantiation of those expectations) is helpful
in accounting for how people arrive at an interpretation of
a story. If all stories could be understood by the
reciprocal processes of expectation and substantiation, then
future work in natural language processing could focus
exclusively on issues of the representation of knowledge and
the organization of that knowledge in memory.
Unfortunately, this turns out not to be the case. First of
all, people are able to understand wholly unexpected events
in a story, which a strictly expectation-based understander
would fail to interpret correctly. This is especially clear
in the case of a story which contains a surprise ending, as
in the following version of one of Aesop's fables:
[2] The crow was sitting in her tree holding a
piece of cheese, when along came the fox,
"Sing for me. Crow," implored the fox, "for
you have the most lovely voice in all the
world," The crow was much impressed by this
flattery, and she opened her mouth to sing.
When she did so, the cheese fell out of her
mouth, and the fox ran away with it, laughing
as he ran. The cheese was what he wanted all
along.
When we first read the fox's request that the crow sing, we
can only infer that the request is genuine, and that he
wants to hear her singing. We may suspect that the fox has
some hidden plan in mind, but we certainly cannot tell what
that plan is from the story at that point. When we
eventually see that the cheese falls and the fox grabs it,
we can then recognize that the fox's actual goal was to get
the crow to drop the cheese. Had this goal been stated at
the beginning of the story, we would have made different
inferences from the fox's actions,
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The experience of conscious surprise while
understanding a story indicates that the reader has
generated some predictive inference or expectation, and has
subsequently decided to invalidate that expectation and
supplant it with a different inference that was not
previously predicted. For example, consider the following
version of the old Henny Youngman joke:
[3] I took my wife to the Bahamas, but
unfortunately she found her way back home.
When we hear the first part of this sentence we infer that
the speaker took his wife with him on a vacation. However,
the second half of the example says that his wife found her
way back home, and implies that he didn't want her to do so.
Upon hearing this, we abandon our initial inference, and
infer instead that the speaker took his wife to the Bahamas
so that she would stay there and be out of his proximity
from then on.
If the example instead said "I took my wife to the
Bahamas, and we had a wonderful vacation", the natural
inference predicted from the first part of the example is
substantiated by the subsequent part of the statement, and
no surprise occurs.
Even when a story does not cause us to experience
conscious surprise, a reader may have to make an inference
and then change it in light of subsequent input. This can
occur when a non-standard activity is performed in an
otherwise stereotypical setting. For instance, consider the
following altered version of the above "golfing" example:
[4] Arnie and Jack were playing golf, Arnie hit
a shot deep into the rough. He wanted to let
his good friend Jack win the game,
(Note that the second and third sentences have been
transposed from the previous version,) In this example, the
most natural default inference from the first sentence is
that both Arnie and Jack had the goal of winning the game,
or at least playing well. In light of this inference,
Arnie's action of hitting into the rough is most likely to
be an accidental action which hinders his goal. Finally,
the third sentence explicitly contradicts our initial
default guess of Arnie's goal, and concomitantly requires us
to re-evaluate our inferences about his action: hitting a
shot into the rough can now be assumed to have been
intentionally performed by Arnie, in service of his stated
goal of wanting to let Jack beat him.
Expectation and substantiation are but two of the
processes that may underlie the ability to understand
natural language. It is the long term goal of our research
project to determine what other types of basic processes
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there may be. The purpose of this proposal is to address
the problem of basic knowledge processes on three fronts;
1. Identifying what basic knowledge processes underlie
cognitive tasks such as natural language understanding
in addition to those we have already hypothesized.
2. Developing the theory of the basic knowledge processes
of which we are currently aware to the point where we
can understand their uses and limitations.
3. Incorporating this developing theory into computer
programs with the intention of both evaluating the
theory and extending the capabilities of our existing
language understanding programs.
We feel that we have already made considerable but
unexhaustive progress towards developing a theory of basic
knowledge processes. We have identified a preliminary set
of five processes beyond the expectation-substantiation
mechanism. The bulk of our effort will be to investigate
the nature of each of these processes and their
interrelationships and dependencies as they are applied
during the understanding process. In order to effect this
investigation, we plan to build computer models of these
understanding mechanisms, with an eye to observing their
separate contributions and their interactions in the
operation of an integrated understanding system.
Furthermore, we hope tp investigate how these knowledge
processes might be applied in domains other than language
understanding, especially problem-solving tasks such as game
playing (e.g., chess end-games) and medical diagnosis (such
as in a MYCIN-like system).
We have seen from the examples above that expectation
and substantiation are insufficient to account for the
processing of certain stories. In the following sections we
will briefly introduce the five additional knowlege
processes that we intend to investigate. They are described
in greater detail in section 2.
1.1 Correcting erroneous inferences
When we write or speak, we omit great quantities of
information that we expect the reader or hearer to infer.
For example: "Little Johnny got an F on his report card.
He was afraid to show his father." There is a long chain of
inferences that logically connect those two sentences, and
there are many models of language that decribe how to fill
in such gaps. But there is rarely any guarantee that the
inferences are correct, merely that they are plausible.
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Previous theories of text understanding [7,34r35,12,42]
have assumed that people make inferences while reading.
Furthermore, all- of these theories acknowledge that an
inference made while reading might turn out to be wrong.
However, no previous theory of text understanding has
included . a method of either recognizing when a previous
inference is wrong nor a method for replacing one inference
by a subsequent one based on new information in a story.
The knowledge process of supplanting an initial inference
with a new one can account for this ability of understanders
to "change their minds" about the interpretation of a story.
1.2 Resolving loose ends
Rarely is a piece of text so constructed that every new
idea is developed and completed before any other new ideas
are mentioned. In short texts, the expectations that are
pending are usually resolved quickly, but in longer texts,
the problem of pending expectations, or "loose ends," can be
severe. When we finish reading a text, or some section of
it, we notice that some of our expectations were not
completed or not fulfilled.
Perhaps the simplest case where expectations cannot be
immediately resolved is a narrative describing the actions
of several characters, in which the presentation of events
is chronological. After hearing about one character for a
while, we hear about some of the others, but we expect that
the story will get back to the first character at some
point. If not, we notice the lack of completeness.
A more complicated case would one where the
expectations were structural, not sequential. If a murder
mystery were to end before the murderer was identified, we
would certainly notice.
Of course, not all details require completion, and part
of our investigation of loose ends will include a
distinction between "hot" loose ends which require
resolution, and "cold" loose ends which may be left dangling
even after the story is complete.
1.3 Assimilating new implication rules
Through the acquisition of new information, the
inferences that the reader draws may change. A new fact in
a story may cause the reader to generate inferences from
certain story events that would not otherwise have been
made. For example, we may have trouble understanding the
connection between the two events in the following story:
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John was taken to Hoag Hospital with a case o£
hepatitis. The nurses fed him some Jameson's
Irish Whisky.
unless the story then tells us that
It had recently been discovered that Jameson's
Irish Whisky can cure hepatitis.
This last statement is a fact which causes us to add to our
memories a new "implication rule," which in turn gives rise
to a previously unknown inference from certain events such
as drinking Jameson's.
1.4 Understanding anomalous situations
When we fail to understand the connection among the
statements in a story, and no new implication rule is
presented which allows us to generate any bridging
inferences, then the story situation can be described as an
anomalous Situation. In such a case, a reader may attempt
to generate a tentative new implication rule that will give
rise to an inference that would allow the story statements
to be connected. For example, in the previous story about
Hoag Hospital, in the absence of any information about the
healing powers of Jameson's whisky, we might instead have
assumed that the nurses were simply trying to comfort a
dying man, in spite of the fact that alcohol might be
detrimental to the patient's condition. We call the process
of generating such an implication rule "forcing an
interpretation."
1.5 Recognizing contextual significance
Sometimes a reader will choose to simply ignore a given
piece of text, either because it presents him with an
anomaly he chooses not to solve, or because the passage
seems irrelevant to the rest of the text. The ability to
distinguish between central and peripheral parts of a text
is evidenced by people's tendency to consistently remember
certain parts of a text over others, and their ability to
summarize a text, leaving out the details. These abilities
can be attributed to a process of constructing a story
representation in such a way as to assign relevance to
certain parts of the story while relegating other parts to a
lower position in the hierarchy of events.
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2.0 Details of the proposed research
We have briefly specified five knowledge processes
beyond expectation and substantiation. It is our intention
to investigate each of these five processes in depth, and to
study their interactions within a complete understanding
system. We have previously developed a computer program
called ARTHUR [16,17], which incorporates our early theories
of some of these processes, especially that of correcting
erroneous inferences. The rest of this section will
describe each of these processes in more detail, including
some explanatidn of ARTHUR'S operation. It is our intention
to build a computer understanding system whose capabilities
exceed those of ARTHUR. Such a program requires extending
the theory of basic knowledge processes that we currently
possess.
2.1 Correcting erroneous inferences
A normal, necessary part of the process of
understanding a piece of text is to make plausible
inferences along the way as to the intentions of the
characters in the text. These intentions can often be
predicted once the context has been established. But for
any given context of intentionality, there are many possible
explanations, and human readers are good at picking the most
accurate one at the outset.
There already exist computer models [12,42] that are
capable of understanding such texts by inferring the correct
context (defined in terms of Schank and Abelson's scripts,
plans, and goals [35]) and matching further input with
predictions from that context.
But it is not always possible to make the correct
choice at the beginning, and readers have the ability to
revise their understanding by correcting their erroneous
inferences as they read the text. We have previously
studied several kinds of the erroneous inferences that can
be corrected during understanding, and we have embodied the
theory into a computer model called ARTHUR (A Reader THat
Understands Reflectively) [16,17].
2.1.1 Goal errors
When we read about a certain action, we can infer the
goal that motivated that action. In general, we prefer the
most parsimonious explanation; that is, given two actions,
we would prefer to find one goal that explains both actions
rather than two goals, one explaining each event. After
reading an initial sentence, we may infer a motivating goal
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that subsequently is less preferable on grounds of
parsimony, so we revise our analysis of the text to include
the new goal.
For example, consider this simple story;
Mary picked up a magazine. She swatted a fly.
The first sentence causes ARTHUR to generate the plausible
inference that Mary's goal is to read the magazine for
entertainment, since that is stored in ARTHUR'S memory as
the default use for a magazine, ARTHUR'S internal
representation of this situation consists of three items: a
goal (being entertained)r an event (picking up the
magazine), and an inferential path connecting the event and
goal (reading the magazine). (The upper-case text below is
actual output from the ARTHUR program.)
:CURRENT EXPLANATION-TRIPLE:
GOAL: (ENJOY-ENTERTAINMENT (PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT MAGAZINE))
EVENT: (GRASP (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT MAGAZINE))
PATH: (READ (PLANNER MARY) (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT MAGAZINE))
:NEXT SENTENCE:
She swatted a fly.
:CD:
(PROPEL (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT NIL) (TO FLY) (FROM NIL))
ARTHUR has now read the second sentence and
displays the Conceptual Dependency representation
of Mary's action: she struck a fly with an
unknown object. It next infers Mary's goal is
hitting the fly.
:BOTTOM-UP INFERENCE PATH:
(CHANGE-PHYS-STATE (PLANNER MARY) (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT FLY)
(DIRECTION NEG) (INSTRUMENT NIL))
ARTHUR infers that the most plausible explanation
for Mary's action is that she intends to damage
the fly (CHANGE-PHYS-STATE (DIRECTION NEG)). It
now tries to connect that goal with the previous
goal of being entertained.
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:ATTEMPTING TO CONNECT TO EXISTING GOAL CONTEXT
(ENJOY-ENTERTAINMENT (PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT MAGAZINE))
;CONNECTION FAILS
ARTHUR'S initial goal inference (that Mary plans
to entertain herself by reading the magazine) has
failed to explain Mary's subsequent action of
swatting a fly. ARTHUR has now recognized that
the new event cannot be adequately explained in
terms of the initial goal inference. It therefore
must generate an alternative goal inference on the
basis of the new event, and ensure that this new
goal inference can also account for the previous
story events.
;GENERATING PLAUSIBLE GOAL INFERENCE:
(PHYS-STATE (PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT FLY) (VAL -10))
ARTHUR now generates an alternative goal inference
on the basis of Mary's new action: she may plan
to destroy the fly (PHYS-STATE (VAL -10)).
:ATTEMPTING TO SUPPLANT PREVIOUS PLAUSIBLE GOAL INFERENCE
ARTHUR infers that this new inference may also
serve to explain Mary's previous action of getting
a magazine, in place of the initial
"entertainment" inference which currently is the
explanation for that action.
! CONNECTION SUCCEEDS
The new inference can explain her previous action.
:SUPPLANTING INITIAL INFERENCE PATH:
(DELTA-CONTROL (PLANNER MARY) (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT MAGAZINE)
via an inference that she picked up the
magazine as a precondition (DELTA-CONTROL) to
using it for some other plan (which in this case
was changing the physical state of the fly).
- 9 -
:AUGMENTING INFERENCE PATH;
(CHANGE-PHYS-STATE (PLANNER MARY) (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT FLY)
(DIRECTION NEG) (INSTRUMENT MAGAZINE))
As a side-effect, ARTHUR now notices that the
" magazine must have been the INSTRUMENT in Mary's
plan to damage the fly.
:UPDATING EXPLANATION-GRAPH
ARTHUR now has a representation of the two events
in the story in terms of a single goal (destroying
a fly).
:CURRENT EXPLANATION-TRIPLE:
GOAL; (PHYS-STATE (PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT FLY) (VAL -10))
EVENT; (GRASP (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT MAGAZINE))
PATH; (DELTA-CONTROL (PLANNER MARY) (ACTOR MARY)
(OBJECT MAGAZINE))
EVENT; (PROPEL (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT MAGAZINE) (TO FLY))
PATH; (CHANGE-PHYS-STATE (PLANNER MARY) (ACTOR MARY)
(OBJECT FLY) (DIRECTION NEG)
(INSTRUMENT MAGAZINE))
This representation says that Mary wanted to
destroy a fly (PHYS-STATE), so she planned to
physically damage the fly (CHANGE-PHYS-STATE),
which required her first to get control of some
object (DELTA-CONTROL) that could be used to do
so. These two plans were carried out by getting
hold of a magazine (GRASP) and then hitting the
fly with it (PROPEL).
;SUPPLANTED INFERENCES;
GOAL; (ENJOY-ENTERTAINMENT (PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT MAGAZINE))
EVENT; (GRASP (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT MAGAZINE))
PATH; (READ (PLANNER MARY) (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT MAGAZINE))
The initial goal inference, that Mary may have
wanted to read the magazine for entertainment, is
no longer considered by ARTHUR to be an
explanation for having picked up the magazine.
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lUNDERSTADING PHASE COMPLETED
;READY FOR QUESTIONS
>Why did Mary pick up a magazine?
AT FIRST I THOUGHT IT WAS BECAUSE SHE WANTED TO READ
IT, BUT ACTUALLY IT'S BECAUSE SHE WANTED TO USE IT TO
GET RID OF A FLY.
The question asks for ARTHUR'S inferred goal
inference underlying Mary's action of GRASPing a
magazine. The answer is generated on the basis of
ARTHUR'S supplanted inference about this action
(READ) and the currently active inference about
the action (CHANGE-PHYS-STATE). (The English
generation mechanism used is outlined in Granger's
thesis [16].)
2.1.2 Plans and Scripts
A second type of error is one where we infer the
correct goal but the incorrect plan for achieving that goal.
Consider this story:
Carl was bored. He picked up the newspaper. He
reached under it to get the tennis racket that the
newspaper had been covering.
In this example, ARTHUR correctly infers the goal of the
story character, but erroneously infers the plan that he is
going to perform in service of his goal. By knowing that
the function of a newspaper is to be read, ARTHUR first
infers that Carl will read the newspaper to alleviate his
boredom, but this inference fails to explain why Carl then
gets his tennis racket, so ARTHUR attempts to supplant the
initial goal inference. However, in this case ARTHUR knows
that that goal was correctly inferred, because it was
implicitly stated in the first sentence of the story (that
Carl was bored), Hence ARTHUR decides instead that it
erroneously inferred the plan for satisfying that goal,
namely reading the newspaper. By knowing that the function
of a tennis racket is to play tennis, ARTHUR infers that
Carl planned to alleviate his boredom by playing tennis.
Now we have to explain how picking up the newspaper fits in
with playing tennis. Instead of using the newspaper as a
functional object (in this case, reading material), ARTHUR
considers whether the newspaper might be an instrumental
object for the precondition of getting to the tennis racket
(which is itself a precondition to playing tennis), and
indeed ARTHUR figures out that the newspaper must be moved
in order to get the racket. Thus, correcting this erroneous
plan inference required ARTHUR to re-evaluate its inference
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about the intended use of a functional object.
2.1.3 Causal state changes
A third kind of error is that in which the goal is
correct, the plan is correct, but a subsequent action
actually hinders the plan. Consider this example from
section 1:
Kathy and Chris were playing golf. Kathy hit a
shot deep into the rough.
Since Kathy is playing golf, ARTHUR infers that she plans to
win or at least to play well, but it understands that
hitting a ball into the rough hinders either of those goals.
(ARTHUR can decide whether an action achieves, helps,
hinders, or thwarts a goal.) ARTHUR infers that the action
is accidental; that is, it is an action which causally
results in some state which may have a negative effect on
her goal.
This situation differs from the two previous stories in
that ARTHUR does not change its mind about its inference of
Kathy's goal or her plan for achieving that goal.
Subsequent input might force it to, however. If the next
sentence were:
Kathy wanted to let her good friend Chris win the
game.
then ARTHUR would have to recognize that the initial goal
inference was erroneous, and to supplant it by the inference
that Kathy actually intended to lose the game, not win it.
2.1.4 Proposed extensions
While the process of correcting erroneous inferences is
by far the best developed of the five processes we propose
to study, more work remains to be done.
Our first effort will be to sharpen our definition of
what "accidental" means, by categorizing the events that
directly or indirectly contradict a goal-predicted event.
It is not sufficient merely to notice that an event does not
match a prediction. Non-matching events might be totally
unrelated to the current goals. On the other hand, the
contradiction might be highly indirect. For example,
consider the following sentences: "John wanted to fly to
New York. He lost his VISA card." Contrast that with:
"John wanted to fly to New York. He used his VISA card."
Although the examples are lexically nearly identical, we
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understand that losing the card is an accident, hindering
the goal of getting to New York, whereas using the card is
an intentional action in service of the goal.
2.2 Loose ends
When the correct context inference for a story remains
unknown until some significant fraction of the story has
been read, the story can be thought of as a "garden path"
story. This term is borrowed from so-called garden path
sentences. in which the correct representation of the
sentence is not resolved until relatively late in the
sentence. We will call a garden path story any story which
causes the reader to generate an initial inference which
turns out to be erroneous on the basis of subsequent story
events. Obvious examples of garden path stories are those
in which we experience a surprise . ending, e.g., mystery
stories, jokes, fables. Since ARTHUR operates by generating
tentative initial inferences and then re-evaluating those
inferences in light of subsequent information, ARTHUR
understands simple garden path stories.
Not all garden path stories cause us to experience
surprise. For instance, recall the following simple
example:
Mary picked up a magazine. She swatted a fly.
Many readers of this story do not notice that Mary might
have been planning to read the magazine, unless that
intermediate inference is pointed out to them. Hence we
hypothesize that the processes involved in understanding
stories with surprise endings must differ from the processes
of understanding other garden path stories. Therefore a
shortcoming of ARTHUR'S understanding mechanism from the
standpoint of psychological plausibility is that ARTHUR does
not differentiate between stories with surprise endings and
other garden path stories.
We are currently developing a more sophisticated theory
of the processes underlying story comprehension which
accounts for the differences between the processing of
garden path stories with surprise endings and those without.
We intend to incorporate this new theory into a new version
of ARTHUR (called "Macro-ARTHUR"). MacARTHUR will
differentiate between "strong" default inferences and "weak"
tentative inferences when generating an initial context
inference. When a strong initial inference is generated,
then MacARTHUR will consciously "notice" this inference
being supplanted and consequently experience surprise that
the inference was incorrect. Conversely, when the initial
inference is weak, MacARTHUR will not commit itself to that
inference, but rather will choose to keep around other
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possible alternatives. We call this latter situation
leaving a "loose end" in the story representation being
constructed. Once MacARTHUR has left a loose end in its
current story representation, then resolving that loose end
will involve only further specification of the initial
tentative set of inferences, rather than supplanting a
single strong inference.
We hypothesize that a human understander will
experience conscious surprise accompanying the process of
supplanting a previous inference, while the process of
narrowing down a set of tentative inferences (resolving a
loose end) will not result in conscious surprise. Few
psychological studies of the cognitive phenomena underlying
human story understanding have so far provided few data
relevant to the question of when readers process consciously
versus unconsciously. (Studies include Thorndyke [39] and
Norman and Bobrow [46].) Our new understanding mechanism
will have available to it both the process of correcting
erroneous inferences and the process of leaving and
subsequently resolving loose ends while reading text. These
two processes seem to bear on the issue of conscious vs.
unconscious processing, so it is our hope that study of the
operation of our understanding model may shed some light on
this currently open question in.cognitive science.
2.3 Assimilating new implication rules
Stories sometimes contain wholly novel information,
which must be understood and assimilated in order to enable
understanding of the rest of the story. For example,
consider the following:
[5] John was hungry. He went outside and
collected some ants. John was the "human
anteater" at the circus.
Ql) Why did John get some ants?
Al) He wanted to eat them.
Story [5] contains an explicit statement saying that
John regularly eats ants. Generating answer Al requires the
reader to use this Statement about John's eating habits to
infer a novel connection between his action of getting ants
and his goal of satisfying his hunger.
This story leads the reader to assimilate a previously
unknown fact about the world — that a particular actor may
eat ants to satisfy his hunger. This new fact is not simply
a static piece of information. Having acquired this new
knowledge, the reader will now draw different inferences
from certain events than he previously would have generated.
- 14 -
For example, once the reader knows this fact about John and
ants, then whenever the story next says that John got some
ants, the reader can infer that John may plan to eat the
ants. This inference is not one that would have been made
prior to the introduction of this new fact. Hence, this
fact can be thought of as a new implication rule for
generating inferences during understanding. Understanding a
new implication rule involves assimilating it into memory
such that it can be used to generate previously unavailable
inferences during understanding.
Incorporating this ability into our model of
understanding involves a representation issue as well as a
processing problem. We normally think of inferences as
being expressed in the form "If A then B"; e.g., "If John
is hungry then he may eat ants," However, many inferences
are expressed as state-information. When we say "mushrooms
are poisonous," for example, what we mean is that if you eat
one, you will probably become ill. So what looked like a
state (MUSHROOMS +POISONOUS) is actually better represented
as a rule (IF (INGEST MUSHROOMS) THEN -HEALTH), In fact, it
may be that most states are equivalent to a set of
inferences via implication rules in some useful and
non-trivial way.
2,4 Understanding anomalous situations
A situation may arise in a story that appears anomalous
to the reader; that is, the reader is unable to make sense
of the events that occur in the story. Consider just the
first two sentences of example [5] above:
[6] John was hungry. He went outside and
collected some ants.
In the previous version of this example, it was
explicitly stated that John ate ants for a living in the
circus. Understanding that story required using that fact
to generate a new inference connecting John's hunger to his
getting ants. In the current example, however, no such
explicit new implication rule is given. Yet readers of this
story typically answer, when queried, that John probably
planned to eat the ants. Giving this response implies that
the readers have somehow generated and then applied the very
implication rule that was explicitly supplied by the
previous example. People typically attempt to connect up
the events in a story by finding some unifying thread that
serves to tie together otherwise disconnected events. In
order to do so in example [6], the reader creates an
implication rule which allows a bridging inference to be
generated for this example. We call the process of
generating such an implication rule "forcing an
- 15 -
interpretation."
2.5 Recognizing contextual significance
Not all events are created equal. It is important to
be able to distinguish between details of a text that are
crucial to understanding and those that are not. In effect,
this amounts to knowing the bounds of relevance for any
event. While we customarily think of events in a text as
being goal-driven and somehow all connected, we need to know
the context of each event, that is, the goal that motivates
each event, so that we understand it relevance to the text
in general.
Furthermore, there are hierarchies of goals — only
some goals are crucial to the action in the text. In
general, high-level goals are distinguished from low-level
goals by the effect their achievement (or lack of
achievement) has on the rest of the text, and an event
inherits the significance of the goal that motivates it.
Schank and Abelson [35] describe a problem-solving
hierarchy of goal types for social and physical acts. This
is useful for measuring one type of contextual significance,
namely, that of goals and subgoals. For example, an event
within the context of a script is not more significant than
the script is itself.
Another measure of significance comes from the type of
text. The relevance of a particular event appearing in a
romantic novel ("John walked into the room") may be quite
different from the relevance of the same event in a murder
mystery, and a good theory of significance must account for
the different modes of processing such information.
One application of such a theory is the ability to
summarize a text by representing only the significant goals
and events. The detail included in the summary would be
determined by a significance threshold in the understander.
By varying this threshold, one might be able to produce the
effect of skimming a text.
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3.0 Applications outside text processing
While all the examples we have presented so far have
been related to text understanding, we believe that these
same five processes, along with the traditional
expectation-substantiation mechanism, can be applied to
Other domains as well. In particular, they have relevance
to expert systems and problem solving. To illustrate this,
we will consider some issues raised by the application of
the basic knowledge processes introdued in this proposal to
an expert medical-diagnosis system, a chess player, and a
mathematical theorem prover.
Medical diagnosis
1. Correcting erroneous inferences. Given the incomplete
state of our knowledge about medicine, let alone what we
are able to encode in a system, there will always be
some uncertainty in the deductions we make. In fact,
MYCIN, the best-known medical diagnosis system,
incorporates certainty factors in all its calculations.
Once an error is detected, the system must have the
ability to trace the extent of the error and take
appropriate corrective action.
2. Resolving loose ends. Does the final diagnosis account
for all the symptoms? If not, should the diagnosis be
abandoned, and will some other diagnosis, compatible
with the first, be found?
3. Assimilating new implication rules. The likelihood of
certain illnesses or a patient's reactions to therapy
may change as information is added to the system.
Assuming that the system will never contain an
exhaustive set of diagnosis rules, it will be valuable
to be able to add new such rules to the system in the
form of "facts" about the world; e.g., "Patients with
disease X often display symptom Y," which can be
translated into an implication rule of the form "If the
patient displays symptom Y, then consider the
possibility of disease X."
4. Understanding anomalous situations. What should the
system do with information that fits into no known
pattern? Is there a reasonable guess available, or
should the evidence itself be questioned?
5. Recognizing contextual significance. Certain findings
are always important, but others depend on the
particular illness at hand. For example, a particular
symptom may be the deciding factor in diagnosing a
certain disease, while it will be irrelevant to the
diagnosis of some other diseases.
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A game of chess
1. Correcting erroneous inferences. A player is often
uncertain of the opponent's strategy, but he must be
able to cope with wrong guesses and salvage the game if
possible. For example, a player may have inferred that
his opponent is pursuing a certain line of play, and
react accordingly, only to discover later that he has
made the wrong inference about his opponent's true aim.
2. Resolving loose ends. In planning future moves, a
player must keep track of many details — relative
advantage, pieces under attack, and so on. In trying to
understand the opponent's plans, does an explanation
adequately account for all the moves so far?
3. Assimilating new implication rules. The rules for what
to do in a particular situation may change depending on
the state of the game, the player's information about
the opponent's likely strategies, or the player's
decision to change strategies in mid-game. It is
unlikely, however, that a new implication rule will be
specifically introduced to a player in the midst of a
game, except in the circumstance of someone offering
advice to the player, such as "If he maneuvers his rook
onto an empty file, he may be planning to get behind
your pawn structure."
4. Understanding anomalous situations. An opponent may
make an unexpected move, or a player may find himself in
an unforeseen situation. If no known implication rule
suffices to account for the anomaly, the player may be
forced to guess at a plausible explanation.
5. Recognizing contextual significance. Some moves may be
made simply to mark time, but any move has the potential
of being crucial, e.g., part of a sequence that ends
with checkmate.
Proving a theorem
1. Correcting erroneous inferences. In proving a theorem,
one may believe in implications that, when examined
closely, turn out to be false. In following the proof
of a theorem, a reader may make an incorrect guess as to
the purpose of a particular statement or line of attack.
2. Resolving loose ends. Theorems are perhaps the most
elegant case of having no loose ends. By definition,
they are supposed to cover all the relevant cases and
only those. A loose end in a proof may be fatal.
However, not all of the implications of a particular
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statement of a proof need be followed out to completion.
That is to say that a proof may have other consequences
in addition to the particular theorem it proved; it
may, as a side-effect, contribute to the proof of some
other theorem as well,
3. Assimilating new implication rules. Sub-proofs (lemmas)
represent acquired information that may alter the proof
strategy. If a lemma is introduced in the course of a
proof, it is expected that the lemma will be used
immediately.
4. Understanding anomalous situations. Anomalies can range
from surprises to contradictions. A reader (e.g.,
student) who fails to understand a particular part of a
proof may simply take it on faith that the proof is
correct; a reviewer of a journal article containing a
proof, on the other hand, may reject a proof that does
not make explicit any information required to bridge a
gap between consecutive statements of the proof.
5. Recognizing contextual significance. Mathematical
proofs are so highly structured that the significance of
any particular statement is assumed to be known; that
is, its relevance to the entire process is often
explicit. However, a summary can often be made of a
proof in which the key steps are made explicit, under
the assumption that any intermediate steps can be
inferred independently by the reader.
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4.0 Research method and facilities
Language research in Artificial Intelligence begins in
the same way as it does in other, older disciplines —
choosing a problem, focusing on certain aspects of the
problem, and finally asking questions that are precise
enough to be answerable within the resource limits of the
research project. At that point, AX diverges from other
paradigms by restricting the possible answers to
computably-precise process models. That is, to any theory
describing what information people may have, we must attach
an explanation for the ways in which that information is
manipulated in performing the language task in question.
The resulting theory takes the form of a computer program
that solves the problem.
Building these program-models is a long, interactive
and cyclic process of specifying the theory, expressing it
in a programming language, and testing. With the current
technology in programming environments, fairly rapid
prototypes are possible. This is important because it
permits us to make tentative decisions without incurring
enormous commitments and to fine-tune the model by
increasing its specificity.
An important effect of this method is that we learn
from the program. One of the the most difficult parts of
testing any complex theory is finding out whether the
interaction of many subparts, each thought to be correct and
well-understood, will in fact be harmonious, or whether it
produces chaos when it is all put together. It is hard to
imagine a better instrument for such a test than a computer.
Since the process model is pointing out where the theory
needs to be revised, we have a built-in guard against
autocorrelation. Our previous work on generating stories by
simulating the problem-solving behavior of a set of
individuals [24] provides ample evidence of this effect.
Both principal investigators on this proposed project
have extensive experience performing this kind of research.
The programming will be done on UCI's DECsystem-10, which
currently has 512K words of physical memory, virtual memory,
and the UCI LISP system.
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